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Abstract 
This paper examines the issue of speculative bubble in the pricing of Malaysian IPOs. In a 
fixed-price offering, one would expect the post-listing price movement to behave in 
accordance to a speculative bubble, where the IPO's price is pushed up high above its 
true value, and later stabilizes as the bubble bursts, especially when there is no stabilization 
activity taking place. One would also expect that this speculative bubble will be 
predominant in IPOs that have high pre-listing investor demand, and in IPOs that are 
categorized as hot issues. In general, the Malaysian fixed-price IPOs do not exhibit the 
characteristics of  speculative bubble. With high demand POs and hot issues IPOs, there 
is a significant jump in price during the first day of trading, but later the prices starts to 
drop gradually from their peak to their "true" value; there is no sudden drop in price as in 
the case of a speculative bubble. Prices seem to stabilize almost immediately in the after-
market. 
Key words: Malaysian IPOs, fixed-price IPOs, hot IPOs, cold IPOs, speculative bubble 
JEL classification: G12, G14, 1524 and 1532 
1. Introduction 
Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) suggest that IPOs are subject to over-valuation or fads in the 
early after-market trading. They also suggest that investor optimism or pessimism in the 
aftermarket may result in an over- or under-reaction in first few weeks of trading. This 
means that the early after-market prices of IPOs are not a "true" reflection of their intrinsic 
values. Even-though speculative bubbles are characterized by a long run-up in price followed 
by a crash (see for example, Kalok, McQueen & Thorley, 1998), with IPOs, the situation is 
slightly different. An IPO has no historical prices that show the long run-up; we can only 
see a sudden increase in the after-market price of an 1P0 over its offer price. In the case of 
IPOs, the sudden increase in price during the early after-market trading can be attributed 
to at least two components. The first componeht reflects the "perception" of investors 
regarding the true value of an IPO, where investors in general believe thatthe IPO concerned 
is excessively under-priced. The second component is due to speculative activities in the 
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early trading of the said IPO that can result in the sudden jump in its price. The "speculative" 
component can give rise to a "speculative bubble." This situation can be more prominent 
for IPOs that are in high demand and also in hot issue IPOs. 
In the US, Boome, Dahya and Shi (2010) examined the information aggregation process 
of an after-market trading of 2,040 US IPOs between 1993 and 2000, and found that it 
takes approximately one week for all P0-related information to be reflected in the market 
price, and thus reflect its true value. They attribute this "fast" information aggregation to 
book-building pricing mechanism and to the highly liquid us IPO after-market. In the 
Malaysian context, book-built IPOs are still not common; fixed-price mechanism is the 
most common IPO pricing mechanism in Malaysia. Furthermore, the Malaysian capital 
market is still considered an emerging market with a lesser degree of liquidity compared 
to the developed US market. 
Unlike book-built lPOs, the offer price of a fixed-price IPO is not determined via 
solicitation from potential buyers, and as such the issuing firm has very little information 
regarding the potential investor demand for the IPO, with the offer price that has been 
fixed. Since there is no soliciting activity taking place, it is hard for both the issuing firm 
and the potential investors to determine the "true" value of the IPO. This means that all 
information about the "true" value of an IPO is not being fully reflected in the offer price 
at the time when the price is fixed. Over-subscription ratio, which is a proxy for investor 
demand, can at least tell whether investors are under- or over-optimistic about the future 
prospect of an 1P0. An IPO with a very high over-subscription ratio indicates a high degree 
of investor optimism about the firm, which can lead to a high level of under-pricing. In this 
study, it was hypothesized that over-optimism among investors will lead to high trading 
and speculative activities, which later results in speculative bubbles that can last for a 
period of time when the bubbles bursts. As such, one would expect that in general, 
Malaysian IPOs would take longer than one week to reflect their true value due to 
uncertainty regarding their "true" values, and due to the illiquid nature of the Malaysian 
capital market. In addition, one would expect IPOs with high pre-listing investor demand 
to have higher levels of under-pricing compared to IPOs with low demand due to over-
optimism among the investors (which will be carried over to the secondary market), 
especially from those investors who are not successful in their early bid. 
Ritter (1984) defines a hot IPO issue as an IPO with a high level of initial return. An 
P0 with a very high initial return might indicate a high degree of investor optimism about 
the firm, which can lead to a high level of speculative activities. This situation might later 
result in speculative bubbles that can last for a substantial period of time before the bubbles 
burst. As in the case of high demand IPOs, it is hypothesized that a hot issue IPO will 
behave in accordance with a speculative bubble that can last for a substantial period of 
time, longer than cold issue IPOs. 
As suggested by Hong, Scheinkman,and Xiong (2006), with more investor participation, 
there will be better risk-sharing which can lead to a larger bubble, and with more investors 
there will also be greater divergence of opinion which can also lead to a larger bubble, In 
line with this line of argument, it is hypothesized that IPOs with high pre-listing investor 
demand will have higher levels of under-pricing and larger bubbles compared to low-
demand IPOs. As pointed out byAgarwal, Liu, and Rhee (2008), in the case of Hong Kong 
IPOs, high investordemand will more likely result in a speculative bubble in an IPO due to 
investor over-optimism regarding the firm's future. Moreover, Malaysian fixed-price IPOs 
should experience a longer period (more than a week) of price stabilization compared to 
book-built IPOs in the developed US market, as reported by Boome, Dahya, and Shi (2010). 
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The longer stabilization period can be argued to be due to the not-so-liquid Malaysian 
capital market as compared to US market, and higher uncertainty regarding the "true" 
value of the IPOs that employ the fixed-price pricing mechanism rather than the book-
building mechanism. 
The motivation for this study is multi-dimensional. Firstly, Yong and Isa (2003) found 
that over-subscription ratio (a proxy for investor demand) has a significant relation with 
the level of under-pricing of Malaysian IPOs. However, there is no attempt made to try to 
relate investor demand with the speculative bubble hypothesis. From an investor's point 
of view, it is important to know whether a high demand for an IPO issue will result in a 
speculative bubble in the after-market trading activities due to a supposedly high trading 
activity following the high demand for that particular IPO during the pre-market period. 
The current study fills this void. 
Secondly, in line with the first motivation, according to Welch (1992), bandwagon 
effects may develop if potential investors choose to pay attention to what other investors 
are doing (i.e. purchasing), regardless of whether or not they themselves posses favorable 
information regarding the IPO. As such, an IPO issuer is "forced" to under-price its IPO in 
orderto induce the first few potential buyers, and later hopefully will induce other investors 
to follow suit. In a way, the under-pricing of IPOs is used as a tool for creating a "demand 
effect" in an IPO exercise. In the current study, over-subscription ratio is used as a proxy 
for investor demand. A high over-subscription ratio indicates a high demand for an IPO. 
It is hypothesized that a high investor demand for an IPO will result in a high level of 
under-pricing and thus, high levels of speculative bubble in the IPO after-market. Unlike 
Yong (2011) who suggests that bandwagon effect may explain the under-pricing 
phenomenon in Malaysian IPOs, the current study looks at this issue in greater detail. 
Thirdly, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, the bandwagon effect is the result 
of the IPO issuer being forced to under-price its IPO in order to attract potential buyers. 
Thus, it is hoped that the higher, the level of under-pricing, the more the demand that will 
be created from the potential investors. This means that the hot issue IPOs will attract 
more potential buyers compared to cold issue IPOs, which later can result in higher levels 
of speculative bubble. Based on this argument, it is hypothesized that hot issue IPOs will 
result in high levels of speculative bubble that will persist for a considerably longer time 
than that of cold issue IPOs. 
This remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Following the introduction section, 
Section 2 discusses the data and methodology used. Section 3 presents the results, whilst 
Section 4 concludes and discusses implication of the findings. 
2. Data and Methodology 
The sample for this study comprised 283 fixed-price IPOs listed on Bursa Malaysia from 
January 2004 to December 2011. The data begins in January 2004 in line with the name 
change of the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange to Bursa Malaysia in January 2004. 
Fixed pricing is the most common lPO pricing mechanism in Malaysia. Unlike book-
built offer, with a fixed-price offer, the offer price is set prior to allocation to subscribers, 
and in the case of demand exceeding supply, shares are rationed on a pro rata or lottery 
basis. In the current study, the focus is on the fixed-price IPOs and as such book-built IPOs 
are excluded from this study. Anyway, the number of book-built IPOs is less than 10 during 
our sample period, which is not that significant. IPOs that are classified as REITs are also 
excluded.
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The sample comprised of fixed-price IPOs with no price stabilization mechanism (or 
Greenshoe option), and also IPOs with Greenshoe option but did not exercise the option. 
This means that even-though a company may have the price stabilization mechanism 
attached to its IPO, it is still included in this study if it does not exercise that Greenshoe 
option, since the option can only be exercised within the first 30 calendar days starting 
from its first trading day, if the market price is below the offer price. For instance, Xingquan 
International Sports Holdings (listed in 2009) was excluded from the sample because it 
exercised the Greenshoe option, whereas Petronas Chemical (listed in 2010) is included 
because it did not exercise the option. MSM Malaysia Holdings (listed in 2011), a company 
with the price stabilization mechanism, was excluded from the sample due to its pricing 
mechanism, which is book-building, even-though it did not exercise its Greenshoe option. 
A company by the name of Berjaya Retail (listed on 16th August 2010, and later delisted on 
3'd May 2011) was also excluded from the sample due to its infrequent trading days (less 
than 5 days in total, during the first month of its listing). The reason why these IPOs were 
excluded from this study is to ensure that the price movements in these IPOs are "free" 
from stabilization activities and the price movements are in their normal course without 
"artificial" intervention from the stabilization activities. Altogether, the sample comprised 
of 283 fixed-price IPOs. 
The information used in this study was compiled from Bursa Malaysia website (http:/ 
/www. bursarnalaysia.com
 and http//:www.k/se.info/cocinters/historjcaf-prices/) and the 
Star Online website (http://biz.thestar.corn.my/rnarketwatch/ipo) . Information on over-
subscription ratio was compiled from various newspapers' reports, especially the 
information made available on the BiznewsDatabank website (http://www.biznewsdb. 
corn ), Malaysian Issuing House (MIH) website (http://www.mih.com.my), and MIN website 
(http://www. rnidf. corn. rny/crns/news/news89).
 
Initial return was calculated as the percentage change in price from the offer 
price to the closing price of the first day of trading. In some cases, the offer price for retail 
investors was different from the offer price for institutional investors. In this study, offer 
price refers to the offer price for retail investors. The offer price for retail investors was 
used because it reflects the public allocation rather than non-public (i.e. institutional) 
allocation. 
In this study, over-subscription ratio was used as a proxy for pre-listing investor 
sentiment, or rather, investor demand, specifically the demand by the retail investors 
(individual rather than institutional investors); as such, over-subscription ratio refers to 
the over-subscription ratio for retail investors. A high over-subscription ratio indicates a 
high demand foran IPO by the retail investors who are supposed to be not so knowledgeable 
(or uninformed) aboutthe "true" value of the IPO as opposed to the institutional (informed) 
investors. The sentiment that exists among these uninformed investors will be carried 
over into the secondary market (or when the IPO is traded in the open market), where the 
unsuccessful investors will compete heavily in the secondary market in orderto be able to 
purchase the IPO, and this speculative trading activity will result in speculative bubbles in 
the IPO which are in high demand for a period longer than IPOs with low demand. In line 
with this argument, it is conjectured that an IPO with a high over-subscription ratio will 
result in a longer period of speculative bubble and a high level of price increase during the 
first 20 days of its trading in the after-market. The analysis was conducted for a period of 
20 trading days, which is approximately equivalent to four trading weeks, in line with the 
stabilization period of 30-calendar days practised in Malaysia. 
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In order to evaluate the impact of investor sentiment on the speculative bubble, these 
283 IPOs were grouped into three equally-weighted portfolios based on the pre-listing 
investor demand or the over-subscription ratio, consisting of low-demand IPOs, medium-
demand IPOs and high-demand IPOs. The lowest over-subscription ratio quartile was 
assigned to the low-demand IPO portfolio, and the highest over-subscription ratio quartile 
was assigned to the high-demand IPO portfolio. The rest of the IPOs were assigned to the 
medium-demand IPOs. A similar methodologyfor grouping lPOs based on investor demand 
is used by Agarwal,Liu, and Rhee (2008) in the case of Hong Kong IPOs. 
Percentage return on day t for portfolio i is calculated as 
R r = [(PS, 
- t N p 1 ] x 100, 
where, R. refers to the percentage return received by portfolio i during trading on day t, 
is the closing price for portfolio ion day t, and P, 1 is the closing price on the previous 
trading day. Daily returns for up to the 20th trading day were calculated for each portfolio. 
A period of 20 trading days was used to represent approximately 30 calendar-days from 
the first day of trading in line with the 30-day calendar period for stabilization process 
practised in Malaysia. 
Market heat can also be viewed as a proxy for investor sentiment. Market heat can be 
in the form of cold or hot issue; it reflects the acceptance level of the investors regarding 
the true value of an IPO. A similar classification of hot and cold markets is used in studies 
such as that of Ritter (1984) and Yung, Colak, and Wang (2008). In the case of grouping the 
IPOs based on either hot or cold issues, these IPOs were ranked from the lowest to the 
highest level of initial return. The median value of initial return was used as the cut-off 
point between the cold issues and the hot issues. In this study, IPOs with initial returns 
below the median were grouped into the cold issues category and the rest in hot issues 
category. 
An independent t-test was carried out to test the null hypothesis that the return on 
any given day i is not significantly different from zero. A sequence of negative day i's returns 
will give an indication that the bubbles have subsided to a level that reflects a 'fair" or 
"proper" value for the IPO, and the cumulative values of these negative day i's returns can 
tell us how much (in percent) the price has dropped from its peak to its "fair" value. A 
sequence of non-significant day i's returns will give an indication that the IPO's prices have 
stabilized. Due to a higher level of speculative trading activities in IPOs with high demand, 
the level of price drop is expected to be higher in high demand IPOs compared to low 
demand IPOs. The same argument can also be made for the hot issue IPOs. 
3. The Results 
Table 1 presents a summary of the characteristics of the 283 IPOs used in this study, for 
the period between January 2004 and December 2011. The average initial return (offer-
to-close) was 21.42%, with an average over-subscription ratio of 34.25 times. On average, 
the number of shares issued was 73.62 million, with an average offer size of RM111.89 
million and an average offer price of RMO.83. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the portfolios formed, based on the over-
subscription ratio. As shown in Panel A, the low demand portfolio has an average over-
subscription ratio of 1.44 times, with a median of 1.11 times. Nigh demand portfolio has 
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics of Initial Return, Over-Subscription Ratio, Number of Shares Issued, Offer Price 
and Size of Offer; for the Period 2004-2011 
Mean Median	 Std. Dev.	 Mm. Max. 
Initial return (%) 21.42 9.37	 47.78	 -66.67 263.64 
Over-subscription ratio (times) 34.25 14.10	 53.78	
-0.94@ 377.96 
Number of shares issued (million) 73.62 36.51	 174.47	 3.71 2480.00 
Offer price (RM) 0.83 0.70	 0.63	 0.16 5.05 
Size of offer (RM million) 111.89 22.54	 761.69	 1.80 12524.00 
Notes: 
1. Sample size, n=283. 
2. t? An under-subscription of 94%, or subscribed by only 6 % of the overall issue. 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Over-Subscription Ratio and Initial Return, According to Portfolio Formed 
Based on Over-Subscription Ratio
Portfolio based on over-subscription ratio 
Low Medium	 High Overall 
(n=70) (n=142)	 (n=71) (n=283) 
Panel A: Over-subscription ratio (times) 
Mean 1.44 17.45	 100.19 34.25 
Median iii 13.89	 69.85 14.10 
Std. 0ev. 1.45 10.64	 73.22 53.79 
Minimum
-0.94 4.29	 44.98 -0.94 
Maximum 4.26 44.92	 377.96 377.96 
Panel B: Initial return (%) 
Mean 6.13 15.06	 49.23 21.42 
Median 1.14 6.76	 33.33 9.33 
Std. Dev. 39.92 43.44	 52.12 47.76 
Minimum
-65.44 -66.67	 -41.67 -66.67 
Maximum 241.67 263.64	 215.00 263.64
an average over-subscription ratio of 100.19 times, with a median of 69.85 times, whereas 
the medium portfolio has an average of 17.45 times with a median of 13.89 times. 
Panel B of Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of initial return of each one of the 
three portfolios formed. The low demand portfolio has an average initial return of 6.13% 
with a median of 1.73%, whereas the high demand portfolio has an average of 49.23 % 
with a median of 33.33%. The medium portfolio has an average initial return of 15.06% 
with a median of 6.76 % These figures clearly indicate a strong relation between the 
demand for IPOs and the initial return, that is, the higher the demand for an (P0 the 
higher is the initial return. In comparison, for the case of Hong Kong IPOs, Agarwal et al. 
(2008) found that IPOs with high investor demand realize large positive initial returns, but 
IPOs with low investor demand realize negative initial returns. Earlier, Derrien (2005), using 
French IPOs, also found that large individual investor demand led to high IPO prices and 
large initial returns.
Journal of Finance and Financial services vol.1 No.1(2014) 
	Speculative Bubble in IPOs; Evidence 	 from Malaysian Fixed-Price IPOs	 51 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics of Hot Issue IPOs versus Cold Issue IPOs and their Respective Initial Returns 
Cold Issues	 Hot Issues 
	
(n= 141)	 (n= 142) 
Mean	 -7.53%	 50.17% 
Median	 -2.67	 29.13 
Std. Dev.	 15.39	 51.54 
Minimum	 -66.67	 9.33 
Maximum	 9.17	 263.64 
Table 4 
Alter-Market Returns According to Portfolio Formed Based on Over-Subscription Ratio 
Average after-market return (%) for each portfolio, based on over-subscription ratio 
Low (n=79)	 Medium (n=142)	 High	 (n=71) 
Panel A: Initial return (percent) or return on Day 1 
Day 1	 6.13% (0.203)	 15.06% -'(0.000)	 49.23%	 "(0.000) 
Panel B: After-market daily return (percent) 
Day 2 -0.28% (0.694) -0.83% (0.156) -2.06%(0.064) 
Day 3 -1.47"(0.001) -0.32 (0.637) -1.70 (0.104) 
Day 4 -0.36 (0.562) -1.09(0.051) -1.16(0.273) 
Day  -1.19(0.020) -0.57 (0.230) 0.20 (0.881) 
Day 6 -0.00 (0-999) 0.43 (0.364) -0.60 (0.473) 
Day 7 -0.17(0.641) -0.63(0.087) 0.04 (0.957) 
Day 8 0.50 (0.439) 0.17 (0.742) -0.92'(0.044) 
Day  -1.2970.048) -0.52 (0.285) -0.97 (0.057) 
Day 10 -0.17 (0.666) -0.19 (0.605) -0.55 (0.299) 
Day 11 -0.33 (0.618) -0.35 (0.263) -0.26 (0.536) 
Day 12 -0.17 (0.814) 0.04 (0.902) -0.31 (0.554) 
Day 13 0.26 (0.635) -0.69(0.051) 0.23 (0.643) 
Day 14 0.13 (0.777) 0.17 (0.569) -0.43 (0.341) 
Day 15 0.20 (0.633) 0.13 (0.673) 0.04 (0.947) 
Day 16 0.75 (0.190) -0.37 (0.152) 0.54 (0.553) 
Day 17 0.96 (0.156) -0.18 (0.517) -1.27(0.067) 
Day 18 -0.53 (0.171) 0.14 (0.692) -0.41 (0.382) 
Day 19 1.01(0.019) 0.00 (0.999) -0.69 (0.158) 
Day 20 -0.27 (0.486) 5.84 (0.340) 0.61 (0.286) 
Changes -ye =12; -1- ye =7 -ye =11; +ve =8 -ye =13; -1- ye =6
Notes: (1) An independent t-test was conducted to test the null hypothesis that the after-market return on a 
given day is zero. (2) * and ** denote significance at 5% and 1% level, respectively. (3) p-values are shown in 
parentheses. 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of initial return of the Cold versus hot issues 
lPOs. The cold issues portfolio had an average initial return of -7.53% with a median of -
2.67%. The mean for the hot issues portfolio is 50.17 %t, with the median being 29.13%. 
Table 4 details the initial returns and the after-market returns for each of the portfolios
formed based on the over-subscription ratios. As shown in Panel A, the average initial 
return for low demand IPOs is only 6.13%, a figure that is not significantly (p-value=0.203) 
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different from zero. This insignificant value indicates that the offer price of an IPO in the 
low demand IPOs is  "true" reflection of its "fair" value, and as such there is no significant 
increase in its price in the secondary market. This also means that there is no speculative 
bubble in the low demand IPOs. As shown in Panel B, there is a non-significant decrease 
of -0.28% during the second day of trading, which indicates that the prices, more or less, 
stabilize on the second day of trading. However, the return drops significantly on Day 3, 
with a return of -1.47% (p-value= 0.001). The returns continue to drop, even-though not 
statistically significant in most cases, until Day 7. From Day 2 to Day 7, the cumulative 
drop in returns equals 3.47%. If we look at the number of positive returns versus negative 
returns within the first 20-trading days, it shows that the occurrence of negative returns 
exceeds that of the positive returns, an indication that there is an overall decrease in 
value from the closing price of the first day of trading. This phenomenon can point to the 
existence of over-pricing in low demand IPOs, and this slight over-pricing is corrected during 
the after-market trading activities. 
As shown in Panel A, the average initial return for high demand IPOs is highly significant 
at 49.23%. This significant jump in prices is an early indication of the existence of a 
speculative bubble in the high demand IPOs. As shown in Panel B, there is substantial 
drop in return on Day 2 of -2.06%, even-though it is not significant at the 5% level. From 
Day 3 to Day 7, all the daily returns are not significantly different from zero, an indication 
that the prices stabilize immediately during the after-market trading. As in the case of low 
demand IPOs, the number of negative returns exceeds that of the positive returns within 
the first 20-trading days, an indication that there is an overall decrease in value from the 
closing price of the first day of trading. This overall price decrease, plus the fact that there 
is a huge price increase from the offer price to the closing price, can somewhat point to 
the existence of a speculative bubble in high demand lPOs, even-though not exactly a true 
reflection of  speculative bubble where, as pointed out by Kalok et al. (1998), there should 
be a long run-up in price followed by a crash. Even-though it was initially hypothesized 
that high demand IPOs should take longer time to stabilize compared to low demand 
IPOs, the results indicate otherwise; perhaps due to active trading activities in these IPOs 
that result in prices being corrected almost immediately. 
For medium demand IPOs, the average initial return is 15.06%, and it is significant at 
the 1% level, which indicates the existence of a speculative bubble. However, none of the 
daily returns are significantly different from zero, an indication that prices stabilize 
immediately in the secondary market. Again, as in the case of low and high demand IPOs, 
the number of negative returns exceeds that of the positive returns, an indication of an 
overall drop in price from the closing of the first day of trading. The immediate stabilization 
of prices indicates that the after-market prices revolve around their true values. 
Table 5 presents the after-market returns of hot issue versus cold issue IPOs. The 
average initial return of the cold issue IPOs is -7.53%, which is significant at the 1% level. 
The average returns decrease significantly on Day 2, Day 3 and Day 5. In most cases, the 
return further decreases from Day 7 onward even-though not significantly. From Day 2 to 
Day 20, the number of negative returns is 12, exceeding that of the positive returns of 7. 
Overall, we can see a decrease in the prices of cold issue IPOs from their offer price, an 
indication that there is no speculative bubble in this group of IPOs. 
In the case of hot issue IPOs, the average initial return is 50.17%,which is significant 
at the 1% level. From Day 2 to Day 20, there are 13 decreases as opposed to 6 increases in 
returns. These after-market returns are all not significant, except for Day 11, where the 
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Table 5 
After-Market Returns of Hot Issue IPOs versus Cold Issue IP0s 
Cold Issues	 Hot Issues 
(n=141)	 (n=142) 
Panel A: Initial return (percent) or return an Day I 
Day 1 753%**(0000) 5017% **(0.000) 
Panel B: After-market daily return (percent) 
Day 2 -1.66% --(0.002) -0.35% (0.615) 
Day 3 1.42**(0.001) -0.49 (0.530) 
Day 4 -0.85 (0.066) -1.00(0.143) 
Day 5 1.22**(0.004) 0.15 (0.843) 
Day 6 0.64 (0.162) -0.51 (0.288) 
Day  -0.27 (0.445) -0.42 (0.365) 
Day  0.13 (0.804) -0.17 (0.653) 
Day 9 -0.83(0.078) -0.82 (0.058) 
Day 10 -0.19 (0.619) -0.36 (0.248) 
Day 11 0.08 (0.827) 0.72* (0.045) 
Day 12 0.07 (0.872) -0.27 (0.499) 
Day 13 -0.17 (0.639) -0.28(0.453) 
Day 14 -0.24 (0.449) 0.26 (0.395) 
Day 15 -0.02 (0.948) 0.27 (0453) 
Day 16 -0.12 (0.680) 0.39 (0.460) 
Day 17 0.02 (0.958) -0.36 (0.393) 
Day 18 -0.19 (0.591) -0.14 (0.620) 
Day 19 0.13(0.703) 0.05 (0.879) 
Day 20 5.84 (0.344) 0.22 (0.550) 
Changes -ye =12; +ve =7 -ye =13; +ve =6
Notes: (1) An independent f-testis conducted to test the null hypothesis that the after-market return on a given 
day is zero. (2) *and ** denote significance at 5% and 1% level, respectively. (3) p-values are shown in the 
parentheses. 
return is -0.72 % and significant at the 5% level. Unlike the cold issues IPOs, the highly 
significant jump in the price of hot issue IPOs during the first day of trading indicates the 
characteristic of a speculative bubble. However, the sudden jump in price is not followed 
by the crash, but rather a slow downward adjustment in prices, which is not a characteristic 
of a speculative bubble. 
4. Conclusion and Implications 
This paper examines the existence of  speculative bubble in Malaysian IPOs, using a sample 
of 283 Malaysian fixed-price IPOs from January 2004 to December 2011. It was initially 
hypothesized that in a fixed-price offering, when there is no stabilization activities taking 
place, the post-listing price movement behaves in accordance with a speculative bubble, 
especially with high-demand IPOs and hot issue IPOs. High pre-listing investor demand 
will create a temporary speculative bubble where the IPO's price is pushed up high above 
its true value, and later stabilizes as the bubble bursts; the same argument can be put 
forth for the hot issue IPOs. The findings indicate that, in general, IPO prices of the high-
demand IPOs and hot issue IPOs only exhibit one characteristic of a speculative bubble 
where there is a sudden increase in price during the first day of trading. However the 
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second characteristic of the speculative bubble where there should be a crash in the price 
is missing; only a gradual and slow drop in price occurs. The low-demand IPOs and the cold 
issue IPOs do not exhibit the characteristics of a speculative bubble; in fact the after-market 
prices further decline gradually on Day 2 onward. Even-though it was initially hypothesized 
that a high demand IPO will take a longer time to burst its bubble due to a possible high 
level of speculative activities, the results do not support this; the bubble seems to burst 
almost immediately in the after-market. Surprisingly)
 in general, the findings indicate that 
it takes a shorter period of time for prices of fixed-price IPOs to stabilize compared to 
book-built IPOs in the US, as reported by Boome et al. (2010) who found that it takes 
approximately one week for the prices of US IPOs to stabilize, even when book-building 
pricing mechanism is applied there, compounded by the fact that the US IPO after-market 
is highly liquid. 
The results of this study suggest that, at least in the case of fixed-price Malaysian 
IPOs, there is no need to have a price stabilization mechanism because the price can stabilize 
soon the after-market trading begins. The implication of this finding is that there is no 
need for the regulatory agencies of Bursa Malaysia to worry about implementing the price 
stabilization mechanism for all fixed-price IPOs listed on Bursa Malaysia. Even without the 
mechanism, prices will still stabilize almost immediately, once those IPOs begin trading in 
the market place. The immediate stabilization of prices also indicates that the after-market 
prices revolve around their "true" values. This phenomenon means that these IPOs, except 
in the case of cold issue IPOs, are actually under-priced and do not exhibit the 
characteristics of a speculative bubble. 
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